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RICHARD

A.

E PSTEIN

Separation versus Accommodation:
Why We Should Favor the Latter

T

The question that I shall address in this short article has been mooted extensively since
the Founding Period, when Jefferson spoke of the creation of the wall of separation
between church and state. That enduring image makes strong reference to notions of
private property, because of the implicit boundary that it purports to draw between
political and religious activities, each relegated to its respective sphere. An apt literary
metaphor, appropriate to this side of the Midway, comes from Robert Frost:
Good fences make good neighbors. It is as though the two
New England farmers can each prosper the most by doing
nothing to interfere with the production of the other.
Buried in this instructive metaphor lies a strong appeal
to some version of the minimal or night-watchman state
which, while fashionable to some (such as myself ), does not
represent the current reality in the United States. But before
we lament the current state of politics, I think that it is
best to go back to the Founding Period to see if we can get
some sense of how religion was thought about before the
advent of the modern social democratic state. It would be
a mistake to regard the views of that critical period as
monolithic, for they were surely not. But there are some
important tensions that we can identify that help clear the
path toward a better understanding of the use and, more
importantly, the limitations of Jefferson’s enduring image
of the wall of separation.

In earlier times and also today, political theory serves two
offices: one is to justify the current state of affairs, and the
other is to attack it. In our Constitution, we find a strong,
consistent vision of limited government that works off the
following paradigm. We begin with the notion that good
fences do make good neighbors, and thus with the view that
autonomy and private property form the sensible basis for
any viable social union. The explanation for the fences is
not all that different from Robert Frost’s. The recognition
that people have different values, aspirations, talents, temperaments, and, of course, religious beliefs means that a
single life plan will not work for large numbers of disparate
individuals, but would force all people to make unnecessary
compromises that leave them unsatisfied. The idea of property,
The author delivered this essay on October , , at a Wednesday
lunch in Swift Common Room.
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. . . there is no obligation to celebrate strict separation as a permanent and
desirable state of affairs.

which guarantees the exclusive right to some thing — most
commonly, but not exclusively, land or chattel — embodies
that ideal of separation. Once we are liberated from the
necessity of making collective choices, then each of us can
go his or her own way, so that life plans better match individual temperaments. You may prefer strawberry ice cream
while I prefer chocolate; a system of private property means
that neither of us has to settle for plain vanilla. You may be
Roman Catholic, and I may be Jewish; neither of us has to
settle for nondenominational prayer.
There are two critical but friendly qualifications that
have to be made in this basic plan. The first is a clarification:
Property and autonomy do not imply strict separation;
rather, they praise the idea of separation for its role in the
delineation of original rights of all individuals who are, in
the words of John Locke, “free, equal, and independent” in
a state of nature. But there is no obligation to celebrate strict
separation as a permanent and desirable state of affairs. This
position need not be maintained, as like-minded individuals
wish to join forces for one of two reasons. Either they have
complementary skills that allow them to achieve more
together than working separately, or they have sufficiently
similar tastes such that they prefer sociability to isolation.
The key insight is that in both these ways gains from trade are
still appropriate in all domains of life, temporal and spiritual.
These gains, moreover, can only be achieved through
voluntary exchange and cooperation (where the former is
a spot exchange like a purchase or lease, and the latter is
a more enduring tie, as a partnership or association). The
initial strong separation allows us to choose the people we
work with, while excluding all others, so that the sorting
mechanism increases the odds that the collaborative ventures
will work. Without that right to exclude and to choose, the
system will be severely compromised because the fit between
separate and distinctive persons cannot be maintained. It is
a piece of sensible folk wisdom among lawyers that the single
most important feature of a contract is not what it says, but
who it is with. Choosing good trading partners or collaborators is the key to business and social success, in both secular
and religious pursuits. So property and exclusion are not the
antithesis for cooperation, but the prerequisite for it.
The second point is not a clarification, but a necessary
emendation. The sad truth is that, standing alone, this
4

W I N T E R

2 0 0 6

wholly voluntarist model fails because it cannot sustain itself
against the incessant forces of disorder. The social contract
theory fills this gap by postulating a situation whereby each
person surrenders some portion of his liberty and property
to the state in exchange for the provision of greater security
for the rest. There is in the end no total separation, because
some collective endeavor is needed to make sure that the
voluntary ones work well. The questions of constitutionalism
within this framework simply ask what set of institutions is
most likely to confine state power to its proper sphere —
that is, to making the old model of separation plus voluntary
exchange work. That in turn leads quickly into a discussion
about the preservation of property and liberty, and restrictions
on the power to tax (chiefly in the form of a flat tax over
various forms of income) and a requirement of compensation for property that is taken when private owners resist
the sale of strategically located land.

Enter Accommodation

I

n light of these opening remarks, one way to look at this
approach to political theory is as a set of collective
accommodations that start off from a separatist base. The
system stood in the Founding Period, moreover, in sharp
opposition to the common view that the cooperation between
church and state led to some highly distasteful practices.
The most obvious of these was religious persecution by state
authorities at the instigation of the dominant religion. That
was often joined by the view that persons or groups (such
as Native American tribes) outside the faith could not get
compensation when stripped of their lands. Judged by that
baseline, impositions of explicit religious qualifications for
public office were instances that cried out for some degree
of separation between church and state, for example, by the
basic constitutional norm that precluded religious tests for
service in public office. This form of favoritism led to an
uneasiness with an “established church,” that is, one that
receives the support of all through public exactions, even
though it represents the will of only some segment of the
population. Note that the litany of complaints is effectively
neutralized by a system of strict separation even before we
start to speak of the modern concern with the accommodation

As the need for cooperation across various activities increases, the separation
principle becomes less fit for the challenges that lie ahead.

of religious beliefs in a secular state. But it should not be
thought that the modern defense of accommodation would
allow any of these practices to flourish either. On the contrary,
the sensible theory of accommodation has no truck with
any practice that seeks to advance one religion at the
expense of its rivals, or indeed all religions at the expense of
nonbelievers. Rather, it only makes this modest proposal:
Knock down the wall of separation for those cases in which all
individuals, regardless of religious persuasion or affiliation, or
lack thereof, will prosper. In other words, accommodations
will pass muster only if they meet the relatively stringent test
for a social contract: a set of exactions that improves the lot
of all individuals relative to their previous state of well-being
in equal proportion; that is, without altering the balance of
advantage among them.

Why Accommodate?

W

ithin this basic framework, the question then
is which of these two visions — separation or
accommodation — works best in addressing
the full range of problems that arise in the modern welfare
state. The point here is not to denigrate the achievements
that the principle of strict separation made in dealing with
the political abuses of earlier times. But circumstances have
changed in two ways: The major abuses of previous times
have been curbed, while the consistent expansion of state
activities requires a level of coordination between secular and
religious activity that the separationist doctrine will not allow.
These changes in our political constitution do not justify
relaxing our vigilance with regard to two forms of incursion
that should remain off limits: religious institutions taking
advantage of secular institutions, and, conversely, secular
institutions taking advantage of religious ones.
No one can claim that the choice between accommodation
and separation is clear cut; if it were, a social consensus on
these power relationships would have been reached long
ago. But, while caution is always needed, the basic point
remains true. As the need for cooperation across various
activities increases, the separation principle becomes less fit
for the challenges that lie ahead. So let us acknowledge that
the separationist view is simpler to administer, and thus less

subject to erosion by the set of political forces that constantly
seek to undermine it. That said, it has, in my opinion, the
greater disadvantage in that it prevents the use of state power
to increase the welfare of all in the same proportions — something that the accommodationist view allows for, though at
the cost of a more delicate system of administrative oversight of the permitted forms of cooperation.
There is, moreover, a powerful asymmetry between
church and state that drives us toward accommodation even
within the framework of classical political theory, once we
get past the initial set of abuses that drove the separationist
impulse. The enduring relationship between church and
state is not one of equal but divided power, as was the relationship between two Roman consuls. The state has the
monopoly of force within the jurisdiction, and all other
residual rights (such as self-help or self-defense) are subject
to its oversight. That includes the use of force by religious
groups, even in their self-protection. The United States has
many police forces — local and state, with the FBI thrown
in for good measure — and no religious police forces. The
system of separation cannot prohibit any of our established
police forces from providing services to religious institutions. The United States also has lots of roads and infrastructure, but no principle of separation could make it illegal
to allow religious vans on public roads or to keep religious
materials from the U.S. Post Office — itself a regrettable
monopoly.
Thus we reach our first critical junction. If religious institutions are part of the social contract, then they cannot be
left out in the cold with respect to the two fundamental
obligations of the small state: protection and access to
infrastructure and other essential facilities. But here the risk
moves in the opposite direction: No longer is the concern
that one religion will gain huge influence and preferences
because of its alliance with national, state, or local government. Now the tables are turned: Once it is determined that
the service must be supplied, religious institutions should
not be reduced to second-class status.
In some cases, the application of the problem takes care
of itself. Just use the same tolls on public roads, collect the
same gas taxes, and use the standard rate structure for public
utilities. The key here is that a principle of accommodation
allows the state to furnish these essential facilities to religious
C R I T E R I O N
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The key insight here is that all businesses must have in their internal operations
a greater degree of latitude than regulators have in overseeing the economy.

organizations, but requires that they pay for them under the
same rate structure as everyone else. The principle of strict
separation is thus replaced by a nondiscrimination rule similar
to that which assures that citizens of one state are able to do
business in another state on equal terms with local residents.
The situation, however, becomes more difficult when
services are not priced separately, as is often the case with
real estate taxes that are used to fund a full range of government services, from schools to sewers. The current view
allows for the exemption of religious institutions from these
local taxes on grounds that are troublesome, to say the least.
Conventional thinking tells us to lump them in with other
forms of charity and fraternal organizations, and that they
are not singled out for advantage. Even so, the power of
religious institutions (from which only some benefit) is
increased relative to that of their nonreligious competitors
who need not get the same subsidy. But here the taxes are
often a substitute for direct services, and if you do not pay
for them, then someone else must. The separationist position
would not allow the provision of the service. The accommodation position requires the provision of the service but
demands the elimination of the subsidy. We thus find that
it resonates with the standard appeal to limited government.
You can and should mix church and state subject to one
condition: no cross subsidies.
The question then is how all this plays out. In the earlier
times, once the problem of corruption and favoritism in
appointment to public office was overcome, the residual
tensions would be far less than they are today, when the
state injects itself into every area of social life. We do not
have to deal with the role of religion in public schools, for
example, if we do not have public schools in the first place.
Quite simply, the fewer the activities that the government
undertakes, the less the pressure on church-state relationships.
Yet all is not so easy, even in the smallest of states. As a general
matter, the state works in two separate fashions. In the first,
it taxes and regulates in order to maintain social order. In
this regard, the correct position is one that includes religious
organizations in the mix, but on terms that do not (to the
extent that it is possible with human institutions) alter the
relative strength of religious versus nonreligious groups. Nor
should state intervention alter the balance among different
religious groups.
6
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Greater difficulties arise, however, with the second side
of the coin. Even in small states the government does more
than regulate. At minimum, it must hire employees to operate
its various systems. In addition, it necessarily supplies infrastructure (such as roads) and public spaces (such as squares
and parks), all of which are open to all people on terms of
equal access. The question here is how it ought to manage these
operations and these spaces. Both require more work than
does a system of regulation and taxation, because now all
levels of government discharge highly complex and sensitive
management functions. The situation only gets more complicated with education. Let us consider representative cases
from these three areas.

Employment

C

onsider a simple example. Suppose that a Jewish
military chaplain wants to wear a keepah during
working hours when a general and neutral military
regulation, adopted for other reasons (uniformity within the
armed forces) prohibits the use of all headwear. We have a
liberal system that now seeks to obey the tenets of both prongs
of the religion clauses, intended to preserve the free exercise
of religion on the one hand, without establishing any religion
on the other. Walking this tightrope is not easy. First, the conscientious government wishes (in line with the minimal state)
to minimize the interference of the state in the religious affairs
of its citizens. Second, that government wants to avoid any
establishment of religion that is introduced when cross subsidies are given to religious groups or individuals. We thus
have a tough situation. To restrict the use of the keepah is to
pose a limit on religious liberties; this does not comport with
the usual prohibitions against the use of force and fraud that
are the hallmarks of the small state. But to allow the wearing
of the keepah is to give this person some advantage over other
individuals who are not allowed to wear headwear of their
choice, be it a turban or a baseball cap. And the problem
becomes no easier if we allow the keepah but ban the turban,
which is more likely to pose additional administrative hazards.
The key insight here is that all businesses must have in
their internal operations a greater degree of latitude than
regulators have in overseeing the economy. Running a business

. . . the strong neutrality principle, like any principle of strict separation,
cuts too deeply into the exercise of religious liberty.

means making soft and debatable judgments about who gets
along with whom, and under what circumstances. Those
judgments necessarily require some degree of managerial
discretion. In my view, this argument is so powerful that we
should never allow the government to oversee the hiring or
firing of any individuals in private firms. Voluntary sorting
in labor markets will outperform any effort to impose either
a strict antidiscrimination norm or an affirmative action
program, or elements of both. But the state organization cannot be allowed that degree of freedom, given that it operates
with public funds and has genuine coercive powers. It could
not, without upsetting the political balance, exclude members
of certain religions from military service altogether. So
all this results in some lower standard of judicial review for
the military.
When faced with this problem in Goldman v. Weinberger
(), the Supreme Court opted in favor of discretion on the
grounds that “neutral rules” were the best way to navigate the
delicate line between the free exercise and establishment
clauses. The simple recitation of the clause helps illumine
the issues at stake: “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” The tension between these two clauses quickly
becomes apparent. Any restriction on the personal liberties
of religious persons runs into the free exercise clause. Any
special protection of religious liberty runs into the establishment clause. In this case, the Court threw up its hands
in frustration, and took the position that Congress had to
decide whether to veer too far in one direction or the other,
so that the constitutional challenge failed. I tend to think
that the Court was wrong in this conclusion, because this
was one instance in which a rule that was neutral on its face
exerted a disparate impact on religious individuals. Most
people could care less about the rules on headwear, but an
observant Jew does not have the luxury of that indifference.
Rather than rest on the neutrality principle, I would follow
the commonly held view that the restriction should be
struck down in the absence of some specific demonstration
of why this restriction was needed to maintain military efficiency or discipline in an office setting. (In truth, the whole
matter could have been averted by a more sensible commanding officer.) Deciding when to force the state to give
and when not will require courts to show some discretion in

deciding which accommodations to require and which to
resist. But the strong neutrality principle, like any principle of strict separation, cuts too deeply into the exercise of
religious liberty. The implicit test that I use to break the
impasse is this: If private employers have some discretion,
would a solid majority of them take the position that wearing
the keepah is acceptable, or would they push hard to ban all
headwear? My causal empiricism says that the keepah will
be allowed in office settings. Battlefield conditions may well
require different answers, but it should be relatively easy to
explain why various forms of headwear and the like should
not be used. In other words, the lenient standard of review
seems appropriate here, but it is not without teeth.

Public Spaces

O

ur second collective example involves the use of
public spaces by religious organizations. The basic
nondiscrimination principle takes care of this
problem without difficulty when, for example, religious
groups just want to drive their vans along the public highways. But the situation becomes much more difficult when
religious groups seek to use public spaces for their own
expressive functions, that is, to present their own worldviews
to the public at large. The questions that arise are numerous.
For example: May religious organizations rent public spaces
for their own events? May they mount displays of religious
exhibits in public spaces?
In dealing with these issues, the strict separationist is
inclined to answer these questions in the negative. In their
view, there are plenty of private places in which such activities could take place — so why bring religious activities into
public spaces? The other side argues that this exclusion
amounts to discrimination against religious groups, which
are prohibited from using facilities routinely made available
to other private groups for private purposes. Hence, their
view is that the activities should be allowed to proceed on
the same terms and conditions that apply to other parties.
A litmus test analogous to the one above would put the
question this way: How could a conscientious owner of private
space respond to these different pressures? More specifically,
would ordinary sectarian private schools, for example, ban
C R I T E R I O N
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When it is hard to find the ideal intellectual balance, some respect
should be paid to the use of tradition as a stabilizing force.

all religious songs on their premises, or would they have to
allow participation in some carefully regulated setting of
religious activities, such as a lobby sing that included songs
from all represented religious groups? Here there is no
single answer, for some thoughtful teachers, parents, and
students would opt for the strict separationist approach. On
balance, I think that most would choose the “all in,” as
opposed to the “all out,” approach on the grounds that it
allows for richer experiences for all concerned. At that point,
the concern is with balance and restraint in representation
on the one hand, and with the protection of the rights
of those individuals who wish not to participate in these
activities on the other.
My sense is that these guidelines, blurry as they are, work
best in public places. They would allow both the crèche and
the menorah to be located outside city hall, rather than
demanding that the holiday season pass in silence. And they
would allow all groups with proper permits to conduct
services in public places, subject to the usual restraints. But
there are limits, which are well captured in two recent Supreme
Court cases, Van Orden v. Perry () and McCreary
County v. ACLU (), both of which were decided by to- votes — in opposite directions. Van Orden raised the
question of whether the establishment clause prevented the
inclusion of a six-foot monolith of the Ten Commandments
in a display before the Texas state capital, which contained
a wide assortment of monuments and historical markers
that had been in place for about forty years. A single citizen
who encountered the monument on his trip to the site sought
to have the monolith removed, on the grounds that it was
a violation of the establishment clause.
I think that the decision to let that exhibit stand was correct.
Four members of the Court (Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas) supported this decision on broad grounds of the key
role of religion in public life. I prefer the approach of Justice
Breyer, who supplied that critical fifth vote on narrower
grounds. All establishment clause cases are tricky when a
single citizen tries to upset a strong community consensus
in the opposite direction. And the inclusion of religion along
with other influences in American life does not seem to pose
the threat of religious domination of public institutions.
Even if one might be uneasy about the initial decision to
mount the original exhibit, some respect for settled expec8
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tations should allow an exhibit that has been on display for
over  years to stay there. When it is hard to find the ideal
intellectual balance, some respect should be paid to the use
of tradition as a stabilizing force.
I also think that Breyer was correct, in McCreary County,
to join with the four dissenters from the Van Orden case
(Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg) to strike down
displays of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky county
courthouses. It was quite clear that this exhibit had been
pushed hard by religious groups. Their original efforts to
have only the Ten Commandments on display was aborted
because of obvious establishment clause concerns: Putting
a source of law in a court house does suggest that it has disproportionate influence over judicial deliberations — and
that result was not sanitized by a new installation surrounding
the Ten Commandments of other symbols of American life,
such as a copy of the Star-Spangled Banner, to conceal the
original motivation.
In cases like this it is easy to see why grounds of distinction
between the two exhibits in public spaces are hard to defend,
and hence it is easy to praise the stout consistency of the
eight justices who voted either up or down in both cases.
But in the end, since the issue does count as one of balance,
the Breyer approach offers about the right compromise in
an area that will always require some measure of judgment
and discretion. No one thinks that the establishment clause
concerns are stronger in Van Orden than in McCreary
County. Why not draw the line between them?

Education

O

ur last problem area involves education, and here
there are two very different forms of concern. One
is whether individual students should be allowed
to opt out of the public system of education in order to
enroll in private religious schools or whether the state may
force them to remain in it. On this point, the separationists
are in general happy to see the creation of private religious
schools, because it helps cordon off the influences of religion in public space. The accommodationists think that
opting out of public institutions is a way to correct against
the dangers of a state monopoly in education. Thus the easy

If we are to have public education at all, then a somewhat messy accommodation
seems better than a rule of strict separation . . .

position is one that protects the ability of all individuals to
obtain private schooling as a right, in either religious or
nonreligious institutions.
But this is just where the difficulties begin — for what
should be done to respect religious liberties of students who
remain within the public system? Here the first round of
litigation involved the question of whether Jehovah’s Witnesses should be required to recite the Pledge of Allegiance,
when it conflicted with their religious beliefs. After some
false starts the right conclusion was reached: Respect for
religious liberty meant that these students could stand
silently aside during the ceremony and not be forced to
participate against their conscience.
The harder question arose more recently in connection
with the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance.
Here the question was whether the use of these words in
school counted as an establishment of religion. In the end,
the question is a difficult matter of balance, where parallels
to the Ten Commandments cases are striking. There is no
doubt that the state could not put its force behind a pledge
that asked individuals to swear allegiance to a state “under
Jesus.” But the words “under God” are less specific and more
inclusive, and have in any event been around for over fifty
years. At this point, the great danger of establishment-clause
litigation is that a single outlier in the general population might
determine which educational institutions are operated —
too high a price to pay in a democratic system charged with
operating public institutions. So the words should stay in the
pledge, and those who choose not to recite it can stand aside,
no questions asked, just as in the Jehovah’s Witnesses cases.
A second issue that arises with education is that of public
funding for various activities, such as remedial education,
that are undertaken in both public and religious schools. Here
the strict separationist line says that public funds can be
spent only for education supplied in public schools, which
cuts the private religious schools out of these programs. I
think that this line of argument is in general a mistake,
because it is clear that parents of religious students have to
contribute to the public schools to which they choose on
principle not to send their children. Some form of opt-out
from general taxation is not really feasible, if only because
the school taxes are imposed on all sorts of people and businesses with no children of school age. So the better solution

is to allow the participation of religious schools and students
in these programs on equal terms with those children in
public schools. I would also allow this education to be supplied in religious schools proper. It is too costly in terms of
time, money, and emotional wear and tear to ship students
around from school to school for special education. It is relatively easy to make sure that moneys are not funneled into
purely religious activities. If we are to have public education
at all, then a somewhat messy accommodation seems better
than a rule of strict separation that puts religious institutions
at a serious disadvantage with regard both to public schools
and private religious schools.

A Sober Conclusion

T

his analysis of church and state reveals several main
points. First, we Americans should take some pride
in having organized both public and private institutions in ways that have defused the abuses of church-state
relationships that were common earlier in our history. But
the rhetoric of separation that proved so effective in those
settings does not quite work in more modern times, when
the expectations for state involvement in all areas of life are
so much greater than in earlier times. Perforce we have to
move from separation to accommodation, along the lines
that I have set out. This principle works well in easy cases
of police protection and highway use, and less well with
respect to government employment, the management of
public spaces, and public education. But it is important not
to despair at the messy judgments at the margins and the
deep-seated divisions on these issues. When one steps back
from the grubby particulars, the overall structure looks
about right where it now is. On matters like these, we can
only rely on our general sensitivity to the strong claims on
both sides to steer a steady course through treacherous
shoals. To be forewarned is to be forearmed, the old saying
goes. It certainly applies to the vexed topic of church and
state relations. 
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